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SOME OPTIMISM ABOUT FAIR USE AND COPYRIGHT LAW
by MICHAEL J. MADISON*

I.
It is neither possible nor desirable to design a legal regime that maps
precisely onto lived experience. A perfectly detailed map of the law
would function therapeutically, looking at all that has happened in the
world and trying in some way to fix it,1 and aspirationally, looking to what
lawmakers would like to see happen and bridging gaps between the present and the future. That load — life in all of its historical and ideational
details, past, present, and future — is too much for any institution or discipline to bear in full. An image from the work of Jorge Luis Borges captures law’s dilemma. Borges’s Of Exactitude in Science2 described a
mapmaking project that eventually grew so vast — “a Map of the Empire
that was of the same Scale as the Empire and that coincided with it point
for point” — that the project was abandoned by later generations, being
“Less attentive to the Study of Cartography,” on account of its uselessness. Like any institution adapted for human use, law tracks and simplifies
patterns of behavior.
The Borgesian problem afflicts copyright law today, a legal field that
has gotten so vast and detailed, and so unhelpful in many respects as a
map to the territories of human knowledge, learning, and creativity, that
some suggest that policymakers should start anew.3 Evidence of the problem is found in copyright’s expansive scope and in its hyper-intricate com*Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research, University of Pittsburgh
School of Law. Email: madison@pitt.edu. Copyright 2010 Michael J. Madison.
Email: madison@pitt.edu. I have been a member of the Boards of Legal Advisors
for several of the Codes of Best Practices in Fair Use projects organized by the
Center for Social Media at American University.
1 This is a tiny copyright pun. I mean “fix” both in the “stabilize” sense and in
the “make it better” sense. I recognize that critical scholars, among others,
have viewed the relationship between law and life less sympathetically. See
Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4
(1983) (describing the “jurispathic,” or law-killing, role of judges).
2 Jorge Luis Borges & Adolfo Bioy Casares, On Exactitude in Science, in JORGE
LUIS BORGES, A UNIVERSAL HISTORY OF INFAMY 139 (Norman Thomas di
Giovanni trans., 1972) (1946). Borges’s work builds on Lewis Carroll, who
wrote of a map produced at a scale of a mile to a mile, which was never
used (“it would shut out the sunlight”), so “we now use the country itself, as
its own map, and . . . it does nearly as well.” LEWIS CARROLL, SYLVIE AND
BRUNO CONCLUDED 169 (1893).
3 See Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 587 (2008).
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pulsory and statutory licenses, digital copyright provisions, and statutory
exemptions and limitations. Copyright’s doctrine of fair use,4 apparently
so cursed and situation-specific as a legal standard that one observer characterized it as “the right to hire a lawyer,”5 serves as a particularly acute
example. Is there a solution to copyright’s Borgesian problem? In this
reflection on the emerging initiative to draft and implement “codes” of
best practices in fair use,6 as mechanisms to carve out territories that are
safe for science,7 I suggest that cartographers of copyright as a whole
might take heart from the conceptual framework that lies at the heart of
that initiative. Codes of best practices may not redeem copyright. But
they offer the outline of a map between life and copyright law. They may
chart a justification for fair use and copyright that follows the compass of
knowledge in meaningful ways.
I focus on the idea of “best practices” rather than on the idea of
“codes”; the word “code” in these contexts seems to be a rhetorical
placeholder rather than a normative landmark in its own right.8 I offer
four related points. I treat them as related themes rather than as fully
4
5

6

7

8

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 187 (2004). I do not agree with Lessig’s
characterization, but the rhetoric is catchy, and in the current copyright climate the rhetoric captures the sense of the law in the popular imagination
— to the extent that the popular imagination imagines copyright.
See Patricia Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Recut, Reframe, Recycle: The Shaping
of Fair Use Best Practices for Online Video, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO.
SOC’Y 13 (2010); Peter Jaszi, Copyright, Fair Use and Motion Pictures, 2007
UTAH L. REV. 715; PAT AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, FAIR IS FAIR
(forthcoming 2010).
Cf. Lord Ellenborough’s statement in Cary v. Kearsley, 170 Eng. Rep. 679
(K.B. 1802) (applying the English doctrine of fair abridgement): “[W]hile I
shall think myself bound to secure every man in the enjoyment of his copyright, one must not put manacles upon science,” cited in Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1994). The quotation refers to “science” in an older sense — the development of knowledge and access to it
— that has been at copyright’s core for three centuries. But the image of
“manacles” on science supplies an odd metaphor; it anthropomorphizes science in an entirely inappropriate way. The problem is not that copyright
puts manacles on science, but that copyright puts manacles on scientists,
that is, on people practicing science. Recasting the metaphor reveals a challenge for the best practices model, which is the risk that the discipline of
practice will inhibit the creative innovator who wants to break free of disciplinary shackles just as much as she wants to break free of copyright
shackles. See infra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
The role of the code is highlighted by a quotation from a recent film. Elizabeth Swann, daughter of the British governor of Port Royal, is captured by
pirates and bargains for her return to shore by invoking the Pirate’s Code.
The pirate Captain Barbossa replies: “[Y]ou must be a pirate for the pirate’s
code to apply, and you’re not. And thirdly, the code is more what you call
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independent points in an argument. First, codes of best practices make
practical the observation that the development of knowledge and access to
knowledge are inescapably social processes, in additional to individual
ones. Second, codes of best practices highlight the existence of institutional settings for the production and re-production of knowledge. Third,
codes of best practices signify the growing significance of blended public/
private institutional forms for the development and application of law itself; “law” reform in copyright is not exclusively a matter for public authorities, such as Congress, courts, the Copyright Office, and international
conventions. Fourth, and perhaps most important, codes of best practices
offer an affirmative vision of the role of fair use as part of a broader project of copyright that extends beyond merely the affirmation of proprietary rights and fair competition in markets for creative and innovative
goods, and in doing so they re-affirm that project itself.
II.
Fair use in American jurisprudence typically has occupied the shadow
of two concurrent images. Fair use, like the common law doctrine of fair
abridgement before it,9 like contemporary common law doctrines of fair
dealing,10 and like the modern civil law practice of designing specific limitations and exceptions to copyright,11 has been treated as the exception to
copyright’s paradigm of exclusive rights. And fair use has been regarded
as peculiarly situation-specific and case-specific. Copyright’s standard account speaks either in terms of the copyright owner’s proprietary right or
in terms of competitive injury to the copyright owner’s incentives, or both.
This conventional wisdom gives fair use no affirmative role in copyright’s
instrumental calculus, the promotion of learning and the progress of

9
10

11

guidelines than actual rules.” PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: THE CURSE OF
THE BLACK PEARL (Walt Disney Pictures 2003).
See WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 6-17
(1985).
See, e.g., Giuseppina D’Agostino, Healing Fair Dealing? A Comparative Copyright Analysis of Canada’s Fair Dealing to U.K. Fair Dealing and U.S. Fair
Use, 53 MCGILL L.J. 309 (2008).
See Annette Kur, Of Oceans, Islands, and Inland Water – How Much Room for
Exceptions and Limitations Under the Three-Step Test?, 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL
L. & BUS. 287 (2009). Professor Kur offers an elegant exploration of the
meaning of the so-called “three-step test” in international copyright law,
including the Berne Convention, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), and the European Copyright Directive, which governs the extent to which member countries may include in
their national law exceptions to the exclusive rights of the copyright owner.
The three-step test is designed to prevent “excepted” uses of a copyrighted
work from competing with “normal” exploitation of the work by the copyright owner.
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knowledge — what eighteenth century philosophers and lawyers knew as
learning and science.12 Fair use is the proverbial safety valve, the condition — perhaps required, at least in the United States, by the constitutional requirement that the government not impair citizens’ freedom of
expression13 — that reconciles a system of private right with a system of
free expression and free speech. That characterization plays out in the
rhetoric of the Supreme Court of the United States14 as well as in several
generations’ worth of leading commentary on fair use. Commentary that
subordinates fair use to earlier authors’ rights, in one way or another, includes suggestions that the law of fair use tracks implied licenses to reuse
protected material, granted by the copyright owner;15 that fair use plugs
transactions cost gaps in the market structure of copyright;16 that fair use
should be viewed in remedial terms, rather than substantive terms;17 that
fair use is part and parcel of the proposition that copyright constitutes a
12

13
14

15

16

17

“Learning” as copyright’s framework comes from the Statute of Anne, which
begins with the following preamble: “An Act for the Encouragement of
Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned.” Statute of
Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Over the
course of the twentieth century, copyright was infected by the idea that its
purpose is to promote individual “creativity,” and by the trope that it is a
utilitarian doctrine. That proposition regarding creativity now seems too
well-entrenched to dislodge, though policymakers have been slow to recognize the need to reconcile copyright’s creative present with its knowledge
past. See Michael J. Madison, Beyond Creativity: Copyright as Knowledge
Law, VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. (forthcoming 2010). The idea that copyright is utilitarian masks the sizable extent to which the social benefit of
intellectual property doctrines depend on spillovers that are not well-accounted for in standard economic models of intellectual property law. See
Brett M. Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual Boundaries, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 801 (2009).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1994) (noting that the goals of copyright can be furthered by restricting the copyright owner’s exclusive rights).
See Alan Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, Study No. 14, Copyright
Law Revision, in STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS, S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH
CONG. 3 (Comm. Print 1960).
See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600
(1982).
See Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What’s So Fair About Fair Use?, 46
J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y. 513 (1999).
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limited, special monopoly granted to authors;18 and that fair use ought to
focus on the creation of new, or “transformative,” work.19 Even commentary that is sympathetic to fair use as a salient feature of an unfair competition model for works protected by copyright tends to privilege a market
orientation,20 or to treat the substance of fair use in the competitive as
vessel defined only by “fairness.”21
That subordination of fair use to private right is curious when one
considers the proximity of fair use to free speech. As manifested in the
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, freedom of expression may be
the paradigmatic value of representative democracy. What gets too little
detailed attention in copyright scholarship is the proposition that fair use
and its fair dealing and “exceptions and limitations” counterparts are the
private law cousins of public law free expression principles.22 Fair use and
free speech are not identical; one cannot be substituted for the other. But
18
19

20
21
22

See Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537
(2009).
See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105
(1990). Judge Leval’s “transformativeness” approach comes the closest of
any commentary cited here to advancing a substantive theory of fair use. In
Judge Leval’s account, however, and as his standard has been adopted by
the courts, “transformativeness” nearly always refers to the individual work
proferred by the accused infringer and challenges courts to weight the economic and cultural value of the new work, which is often uncertain, against
the economic and cultural value of the plaintiff’s existing work, which is
typically demonstrated by the fact that the plaintiff is pursuing the
litigation.
See L. Ray Patterson & Stanley F. Birch, Jr., A Unified Theory of Copyright,
46 HOUS. L. REV. 215 (2009).
See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1137 (1990).
Scholars are familiar with a rich and still growing body of work that analyzes
the relationship between copyright and free speech. The best-known older
work includes Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First
Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180
(1970); Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1979); Paul
Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983
(1970). Excellent recent contributions include NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL,
COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX (2008); Michael D. Birnhack, Copyright Law and
Free Speech After Eldred v. Ashcroft, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275 (2003); Mark
A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); and Rebecca Tushnet,
Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004). Most of this work has focused on
the existence, scope, and enforcement of copyright’s exclusive rights as a
challenge to First Amendment principles. Aside from Professor Tushnet’s
work, little of it teased out in detail the meaning of fair use as a First
Amendment doctrine, except in passing.
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both are models that simplify for the law the normative proposition that
some thoughts, beliefs, and forms of expression cannot and should not be
subject to clearance, either before or after the fact, by owners of private
rights, or by the government. Conscience, speech and expression as lived
experience are related to but are not identical to freedom of expression
and fair use, the rights and legal concepts.23
The lesson that I draw from these affinities and relationships is one
that I want to map onto the codes of best practices initiative. The lesson is
this: fair use and free speech appear to pull normatively in the same direction, in offering safety and security for expression of different kinds,24
even while they pull descriptively in different directions. Unlike free expression, with its normative connections to political governance, social stability, and personal autonomy, fair use as an instrument of knowledge has
been copyright’s stepchild. But fair use is linked to a variety of phenomena, such as private use of copyrighted works and reverse engineering of
computer programs, that seem to have little to do with speech as such. I
embrace the normative affinity. The descriptive discontinuity should be
remedied. And it can be. But not at the level of the individual actor,
speaker, or user, nor at the level of the individual claim, defense, or suit.
Mapping the laws of fair use and free speech at that level is the task of a
Borgesian cartographer; such detail is inevitably unhelpful. The way forward is institutional.
Individualist perspectives have their histories and their roles. Over
the course of the twentieth century, especially during the latter part of the
twentieth century, individual speech and expression rights and liberties
were loosed from their far-off natural law origins and set free,25 jostling
for attention in the metaphorical marketplace of human experience. The
modern link between speech, copyright, and markets is well-established;
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. is largely responsible both for the
“marketplace of ideas” as a defining metaphor of free speech jurisprudence26 and for the closely-related “aesthetic nondiscrimination” theme in

23

24
25

26

I note that fair use is properly considered a “right” in both positive and normative terms, though as interpreted by the Supreme Court it is a defense to a
claim of copyright infringement, in procedural terms. See Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).
I mean “different” both in the sense of “new” as well as in the sense of
“variety.”
An abbreviated history of this development is supplied by Adam Mossoff. See
Adam Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the Administrative
State, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2001 (2009).
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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copyright law.27 This is not altogether a wrong development. In many
ways, market-oriented perspectives on speech and expression represent
the apotheosis of political liberalism. What was lost in the process, however, was any discipline beyond laws and markets themselves. Both free
expression doctrine and fair use got into trouble as a result. As the phrase
has it, political liberalism as the engine of free expression (or, free expression as the engine of political liberalism; theirs is a recursive relationship)
does not “scale” amid pervasive digital networks.28 Nor is a free speech
principle centered on individuals up to the task of resisting the formalist
impulses of the law. Corporations are persons, too, according to the law of
corporate law due process; now corporations and individuals stand on
equal footing, both with full “free speech” rights.29
A similar evolution, starting from individualist premises, has undermined modern copyright. According to modern law, virtually everyone
can be an author, and virtually everyone is.30 Copyright succeeded initially in its given mission — the production and distribution of knowledge
and learning — by commodifying (some might say thing-ifying31) practices
of communication and expression. The digital revolution shows how manipulable the concept and technologies of commodification have become.
We have marketable bits rather than books and other analog artifacts; we
sell and license endlessly combinable and re-combinable digital “things.”32
The trend toward commodification has neither gone too far nor gone far
enough; the problem is that commodification of expression in markets has
never been sufficiently stable in its own right to support the social structures that it has been asked to support.33 Copyright creators, copyright27

28

29
30
31
32
33

See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). See
Michael J. Madison, Complexity and Copyright in Contradiction, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 125, 170 n.177 (2000).
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001) (arguing that the Internet creates a substantial risk of enabling the “Daily Me,” a tool for reinforcing
one’s preexisting ideas). Professor Sunstein’s work has been criticized, see
Dan Hunter, Phillipic.com, 90 CAL. L. REV. 611 (2002), but the tension between fully-realizable individual autonomy, on the one hand, and the Internet, on the other, remains unresolved, and perhaps unresolvable.
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 815 (1935).
See Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things,
56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381 (2005).
As a form of externalization of meaning, commodification, evoking markets,
can be distinguished from objectification. See George H. Taylor & Michael
J. Madison, Metaphor, Objects, and Commodities, 54 CLEVE. ST. L. REV.
141 (2006). Both commodified speech and objectified speech are comprehensible only in broader context. For example, Searle’s and Austin’s theory
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protected things, and copyright markets do not comprise the entire vocabulary needed to describe the copyright system. In both copyright and free
speech settings, digital technology and computer networks — the multiple
sources and outlets of “expression” — everywhere, and all the time, exposed as incomplete the “individual liberties” understanding of fair use,
like its counterpart understanding of free speech. Neither stands up to the
complex demands of media, communications, and human expression. Law
that maps only those phenomena is law that has left society’s destination
too much in the hands of thing-makers and market-makers and not
enough in the judgment of policymakers. Society needs a map that provides guides to both.
What I mean by pointing to institutions as a way forward is that institutions — regularized patterns of behavior, both formal (firms and universities) and informal (scholarship, journalism) — offer the most sensible
way to understand and leverage the normative potential of both free
speech and fair use. The key insights here are those of Frederick Schauer
and Robert Post in the First Amendment context.34 First Amendment
law, they point out (although in different ways), operates via an important
indirection: law’s normative objectives vis-à-vis individuals can be realized
best not by training the sights of Congress and courts on individuals, but
instead by realizing the normative aims of individuals in institutional context. Train the law on institutions, in short, for reasons relating both to life
and law itself. The speech in free speech enables individuals to be who
they are and who they want to be as autonomous social and political beings; the freedom in free speech allows them to build and sustain institutions that make speech possible and permissible. Free expression doctrine
is and ought to be understood primarily in institutional terms, rather than
only in personal terms. “Speech” does not make sense, experientially or
legally, as a disembodied “thing” to be kicked around a “marketplace of

34

of speech acts teaches that under some circumstances, the meaning of
speech is external to the words themselves; the words are “things” whose
meaning depends on their roles in certain social settings. See JOHN L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (2d ed. 1975); JOHN R. SEARLE,
SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969) (distinguishing “propositional” from “performative” speech, the latter consisting of utterances that do things rather than assert things).
See Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1249 (1995); Frederick Schauer, Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1747 (2007); Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256 (2005); Frederick
Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 84 (1998).
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ideas.”35 Importantly, there is some highly persuasive evidence that taking an institutional approach is, in fact, what First Amendment law has
done, especially with regard to journalism,36 teaching and scholarship,37
and political criticism.38 Going forward, Post and Schauer each have argued, we need to de-commodify the act of speech, and re-contextualize it,
in order to save free speech principles. Institutions supply important and
valuable discipline to the otherwise unregulated speech “market.” Speech
is not what we say. Speech is what we do.
I think that a similar shift in emphasis may be underway in fair use,
from the individual to the institution,39 and that this may be the right approach to law reform and practice.

35

36

37

38

39

Professor Schauer summarizes the epistemological case against the “marketplace” metaphor in Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57
UCLA L. REV. 897, 908-12 (2010), while he recognizes its persistence in
popular discourse. The marketplace metaphor cannot explain the fact that
large numbers of people have believed demonstrably false things; First
Amendment protection for the expression of these things can be justified,
therefore, only on some other basis. Likewise, the utilitarian justification
for copyright cannot fully explain legal protection for bad but popular art,
unless the point of the law is circular — that is, simply to ratify individual
choice as expressed in the marketplace.
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defining constitutional boundaries of the tort of defamation with respect to claims by public
officials and public figures against broadcasters and publishers). The
growth of social media (blogs, message boards, social networks such as
Facebook) has engendered recent examinations of the application of shield
laws that protect news organizations to these new settings. See, e.g., Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Heavy Indus., Inc., 999 A.2d 184,
2010 WL 1791274 (N.H. May 6, 2010) (applying state constitutional newsgathering privilege to message board).
See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (reversing conviction of
college professor for contempt for refusal to answer questions regarding
content of lectures, based on the professor’s liberties with respect to academic freedom and political expression).
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (suggesting the existence
of a “limited purpose public figure” exception to common law defamation
doctrine).
Cf. Robert P. Merges, Individual Creators in the Cultural Commons, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 793 (2010); Robert P. Merges, From Medieval Guilds to Open
Source Software: Informal Norms, Appropriability Institutions, and Innovation (University of Wisconsin Law School, Conference on the Legal History
of Intellectual Property, Working Paper (2004), available at http:// ssrn.com/
abstract=661543; Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV.
129, 139-55 (1998) (suggesting the emergent trend toward specialized property institutions in the intellectual property context).

\\server05\productn\C\CPY\57-3\CPY307.txt

360

unknown

Seq: 10

18-OCT-10

11:11

Journal, Copyright Society of the U.S.A.

III.
Since its inception, copyright law has been filled with production-side
institutions: booksellers, publishers, distributors, and more recently, collecting societies. During the twentieth century a handful of consumer-side
copyright institutions developed, such as the cable and satellite television
industries, partly in connection with the design and implementation of
compulsory licenses in American copyright law. Institutional libraries,
museums and archives, and used bookstores, too, are consumer-side institutions that have long flourished in copyright’s shadow. The Library of
Congress owes much of the breadth of its collection to mandatory deposit
requirements adopted during the mid-nineteenth century.40 Copyright has
been dominated by an individual sensibility spurred by the rhetoric of authorship, but that sensibility has always co-existed with a powerful institutional sense.41 Partly via public law (compulsory licenses, copyright’s first
sale doctrine, deposit requirements) and partly via private ordering (private publishers, distributors, and even collecting societies) copyright relies
on institutions to facilitate and discipline the production and distribution
of knowledge that copyright is intended to support. Without pausing immediately to parse the strengths and weaknesses of each of these institutions, in general terms, copyright’s institutionalism is a good thing.
The best practices approach to fair use problems is, among other
things, an important extension of this same institutional perspective. At
one level, codes of best practices represent a modestly innovative form of
private ordering in a domain that has been subject to far grander, more
formal, and more ambitious private institutional counterparts, such as ASCAP and BMI for clearing public performance rights for musical compositions, and the Harry Fox Agency for clearing mechanical rights. HFA may
provide the stronger analogy; it is a private business that operates entirely
in the shadow of a compulsory license but with no special public law privilege or oversight.42 Codes of best practices likewise operate in the shadow
of fair use, but with no public law blessing.43
40

41
42

43

See Peter S. Menell, Knowledge Accessibility and Preservation Policy for the
Digital Age, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1013, 1026-28 (2007) (describing revisions to
the deposit requirement in 1846 and in 1870).
See Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring
Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361 (2009).
See 17 U.S.C §§ 115(a)–(c) (2006). Both ASCAP and BMI operate under consent decree supervision, and other compulsory and statutory licenses in copyright come with privileges for limited antitrust scrutiny, judicial or
administrative review of rate setting, or both.
For some scholars, this is a source of weakness. See Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395, 430-37 (2009) (defending a
formal administrative process for fair use rulemaking that might borrow
from codes of best practices).
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That is not all, nor should it be. Codes of best practices may be forms
of private ordering, but that characterization offers institutional legitimacy
only in the weak sense that any form of private ordering derives legitimacy
from the acts of autonomous individuals. The normative thrust of codes of
best practices comes from a more specific source that links best practices
to copyright itself. I described that source in earlier work on fair use,
trying to make sense of it in institutional terms and aligning that institutional sense both with the goals of the copyright system (law) and the
goals of human behavior (experience). My prior claims are consistent with
the argument implicit in the best practices approach. Those claims can be
broken down into three parts: (1) creativity and knowledge production is
an emergent property of patterned social behavior; (2) those patterns exist
concurrently with but distinct from market-based production of knowledge goods by individuals and firms; (3) those patterned behaviors can be
identified as institutions, and exempting those institutions from the discipline of copyright’s scheme of exclusive rights is likely to increase the social welfare produced by the copyright system as a whole and is likely to
not diminish the social welfare produced by the market side of copyright.
In A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, I argued:
The pattern-oriented perspective, by contrast, recasts creativity as an
emergent property of a complex system. Given a group, or pattern, or
system of some sort, which is not purely homogeneous but which is characterized by a relevant set of sociocultural rules or constraints (such as
context, conventions of a domain, and representation or internalization of
that domain in the individual), novelty or creative production is the probabilistic — though not necessary — result. It is a process-oriented view,
that creativity inheres in the increased number of interconnections that
arise in such a context, to be contrasted with the older product-oriented
view, the comparison of old and new.
The emergentist approach relies in part on broader interest in exploring the properties of complex systems. These collections of decentralized, evolutionary phenomena are ordered roughly by properties that
cannot be captured by descriptions of their constituent parts, which produce complex structures over long periods of time via the interaction,
uncoordinated events and actions. It is characteristic of an “emergent”
system that its properties cannot be predicted completely by analyses of
the properties of its constituent parts; instead, the system is characterized
probabilistically. Examples at levels far grander than copyright law and
creative expression include the laws of thermodynamics, evolution by
natural selection, and evolutionary game theory. At the relatively simple
level at which the approach is represented here, social and cultural patterns can be used to define the contours of complex social systems that
are probabilistically situated to produce creative expression. If one fa-
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vors such patterns in the law of fair use, then it is likely that the creativity
anticipated by the law will emerge.44

In Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, I
continued:
Social practices of this sort are not perfectly accessible, either to laypersons or to the legal system. Their existence and their scope are not uncontroverted. They are not eternal. Over time, they evolve. No fair use
doctrine will eliminate litigation over their meaning, and no doctrine will
enable perfect prediction regarding what is fair and what is not. But they
are sufficiently autonomous, accessible, and durable that they offer a
meaningful guide for achieving the benefits that fair use is meant to offer,
whether that is simple fairness, “the good life,” or creativity of the sort
that the market system may not produce.45

Those arguments should be viewed critically. I noted originally that my
arguments regarding the institutional context of creativity, to which I now
add knowledge and learning, are somewhat tentative. The benefits of
aligning those arguments with law reform regarding fair use are probabilistic, at best.
Those arguments and the best practices approach are highly sympathetic to one another. The “best practices” of each relevant disciplinary
context may be understood as a kind of “pattern” described above, such
that a code of best practices is not merely a private, disciplined, institutional defense to copyright infringement claims, but also a way to express
the fact that these institutions produce creativity and knowledge. The institution should be recognized as a copyright agent, alongside the individual author, creator, or knowledge producer.
And my arguments are probabilistic, in practice there is some good
news: There is evidence of the institutional approach already at work in
fair use. A close reading of copyright’s fair use jurisprudence reveals that
in practice, copyright courts have been pursuing such a pattern-oriented
approach to fair use under the formal umbrella of the four factors supplied
by Section 107 of the Copyright Act.46
As I noted above, the institutional approach to knowledge, learning,
and creativity has been part of copyright all along — though it has often
been treated as a pathology by critics who view copyright as overbroad.
The role of intermediaries, publishers, distributors, aggregators, hosts and
44
45
46

Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1525, 1685-86 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 409-10 (2005).
Professor Mazzone’s proposal for fair use rulemaking, see Mazzone, supra
note 43, appears to be sympathetic to an institutionalist perspective, and he
is explicitly sympathetic to my claim that fair use case law is relatively predictable, along “pattern-oriented lines.” See id. at 427-28.
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so forth has been characterized as a necessary evil in the path to recognition and encouragement for creators and knowledge makers. My view is
that these institutions are not harmful as such; the role of each one has to
be assessed and justified. Whether they are purely private, blends of public and private elements, or something else, intermediary institutions share
elements that can make comparative assessment more straightforward.47
But it is dangerous to paint with too broad a brush. The point is simply
that groups and other institutions possess normative inertia in their own
right and should be analyzed for their normative benefits in particular
cases, rather than deriving their normative status entirely via the normative status of their members and those who adopt the relevant institutional
perspective.48 Section 107 nods in this direction when it recites a nonexclusive series of favored uses that are described in institutional terms:
“criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies
for classroom use), scholarship, or research.”49 Congress did not make up
that list out of whole cloth; the statutory form of fair use is explicitly derived from more than a century of judicial fair use decisionmaking. Those
fair use decisions do not exist as free floating normative constructs, which
judges use without reference to institutional context. Doctrines of fair
abridgement and fair dealing, and the details of the exemptions and limitations section of the European Union’s Copyright Directive, illustrate that
the institutional matrix of fair use case law, which is reflected in the language of Section 107 quoted above, is broadly shared beyond the United
States.
IV.
In emphasizing the normative benefits of institutions in copyright
generally and in fair use in particular, I do not lose sight of the fact that
the doctrinal question is whether an individual instance of reproducing or
47

48

49

See Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657
(2010).
See Cover, supra note 1; Franklin G. Snyder, Nomos, Narrative, and Adjudication: Toward a Jurisgenetic Theory of Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1623
(1999). Importantly, of course, Cover distinguished between groups sanctioned by the state and those that exist autonomously. More recent commentators have argued that Cover’s work challenges us to explore
connections between the state and groups, rather than to preserve distance
between them. See Judith Resnik, Living Their Legal Commitments:
Paideic Communities, Courts, and Robert Cover, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
17 (2005) (“I read Cover as endlessly fascinated with the interactions between the state and paideic communities-and with the potential for such
interactions themselves to be jurisgenerative moments.”).
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).

\\server05\productn\C\CPY\57-3\CPY307.txt

364

unknown

Seq: 14

18-OCT-10

11:11

Journal, Copyright Society of the U.S.A.

distributing a work of authorship should be treated as “fair use” or “unfair
use.”50 For a code of best practices, the question is not merely the existence of the practice, but whether the individual user is operating within it
— that is, whether the individual is honoring the code.51 Individuals may
have powerful reasons for noncompliance, reasons that society often may
want to recognize. Institutional perspectives risk reproducing sameness;52
fair use (like free speech, often) can and should be about difference. Generally, as with institutional perspectives everywhere, the challenge is to
align commercial and cultural interests in comprehensibility, stability, consistency, and predictability with interests in evolution, adaptation, dynamism, novelty, and individual fairness. I have described the possible
normative benefits of a best practices project. What about the normative
benefits — the legitimacy — of the codes themselves?
In my view this question is best answered by figuring out whether it
— the institutional approach, manifested in codes of best practices —
works. Codes of best practices in fair use supply a type of discipline that is
related to but distinct from the discipline supplied by public law and by the
commercial marketplace. What kinds of knowledge worlds and knowledge products do we see as a result of this added layer of discipline?
For now, the answer is partly and perhaps largely that we do not
know; too little time has passed, and there is too little data. Codes of best
practices come with certain costs — the time and labor associated with
identifying a practice, documenting it as such, and communicating the
product to relevant audiences; the risk that the “best” practices will be
seen as a ceiling on acceptable conduct, rather than as a floor — that are
present in nearly every effort to institutionalize a practice, whether the
effort is part of a public or private initiative. It is difficult, in other words,
to assess the costs of a code of best practices strategy as compared with the
cost of any alternative. From the standpoint of benefits, anecdotal evidence abounds that in some contexts, notably documentary filmmakers,
the code of best practices has generated related institutional change leading to the release of some films that otherwise would not have survived a
50

51
52

Older copyright cases and scholars often characterized infringement as “unfair
use.” See, e.g., Leon Yankwich, What Is Fair Use?, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 203
(1954). That binary emphasis on fairness in the use of copyrighted works
seems to have been displaced in recent times by a different binary: infringement, regardless of the infringer’s intent or the nature of the infringer’s benefit, is piracy. For a recent, comprehensive history of piracy, see ADRIAN
JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG
TO GATES (2010).
See supra note 8.
For a helpful introduction to modern perspectives on institutionalist analysis,
see THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter
W. Powell & Paul DiMaggio eds., 1991).
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copyright clearance process.53 In this limited sense, codes of best practices
in fair use are increasing the distribution of some knowledge goods over
the supply available under existing institutional arrangements. Is there a
hidden or unquantified harm to the incentives of other knowledge producers or creators? My intuition suggests that no such offsetting harm exists,
but in truth there is no data on point.
In a broader sense, it is difficult to separate the influence of the codes
of best practices from the best practices themselves. One premise of the
best practices initiative is that these disciplines exist independent of their
informal acknowledgement as part of a copyright reform project. The
codes are partly documenting existing practice and making it salient,
rather than inventing something new. If disciplinary institutions are cauldrons of emergent creativity, then there is little need to reify them with
codes and raise the possibility that working within the code offers legal
privileges that the participants otherwise could not access. Creativity and
knowledge production are happening in any event.
So whether “it works” has meaning here turns on a somewhat deeper
question, which is the normative relationship between codes of best practices, as a species of private ordering, and law reform generally. These
codes are not merely documenting existing practice. Critiques of the best
practices approach that re-characterizes it as relying on custom miss the
mark in my view, to the extent that the critiques do not account for the
reform agenda that lies beneath them.54 The subjects of the codes wish to
rationalize and reform some of what they do as knowledge producers; the
codes appear to argue not just “this is what we do,” but also “this is what
we believe we should do.” And the sponsors and organizers of the codes
wish to rationalize and reform some of how copyright law maps onto lived
experience. Because the initiative is still in its early stages, the scope and
details of that latter agenda are murky. It is not clear, for example,
whether the codes are intended for blending with the text and purposes of
Section 107 when an appropriate fair use case is adjudicated, so that compliance with a relevant code would be a fact weighing in favor of an alleged “fair” use, or whether the codes are being developed as my earlier
writing was offered — as ways to interpret the law as it has been practiced
for many years. Or perhaps the codes are constitutions (small “c”) for the
governance of knowledge disciplines and creative communities, to be interpreted, applied, and refined as autonomous texts and principles, with
no planned connection to the public law of fair use.

53
54

See AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 6.
See Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual
Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899 (2007).
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The most potent objection to any of these interpretations is that no
private group has ex ante authority to appropriate for itself the power to
decide what “is” or “is not” fair use, in any context. That role necessarily
belongs to public lawmaking authorities — the legislature, in the first instance, and the judiciary, as the interpreter of the intent of the legislature.
Group practices are legitimate exercises in autonomous self-ordering so
long as we have no concern for spillovers onto adjacent communities or
other systematic undervaluing of broader values. As fair use is, among
other things, the institutional embodiment of the value of spillovers from
the use of copyrighted works,55 justice dictates that the scope of fair use,
like the scope of related limitations on copyright, be determined by public
processes. Law reform is taking place outside the public institutions of
lawmaking. I have articulated the argument as I think it is strongest in the
fair use context. Related points have been raised since the dawn of the
Internet era against so-called “law” created by private groups dealing in
social and technical standards.56
This critique is, at its idealist and principled core, irrefutable. But as I
have written before, I am a copyright pragmatist as well as a copyright
optimist.57 Similar challenges with respect to other emerging intermediaries — Creative Commons, open source licenses, content aggregators, information services offered by Google, among other firms — have
gotten limited traction. The challenge today is to situate these institutions
in copyright’s existing order and to help that order adapt to them, with
grace, where possible. Codes of best practices can be defended, as I have
briefly defended them, on purely instrumental grounds, but the fit is imperfect. The empirics are tempting but uncertain. The institutional design
intentionally keeps positive law at arms’ length, even while the design depends on the law. Codes of best practices and their sponsors want to leverage the normative value of fair use law into stable, knowledge-sustaining
institutions, without getting too entangled in the risk of actual litigation.
Identifying relevant groups and disciplines and decoding their practices is
labor-intensive work and prone to a variety of errors. It is mapmaking of
a new kind, and no one argues that the technique is costless, or that it is a
panacea. The claim is simply that this is a new way to understand the why
and how of free expression in fair use. It might be called therapeutic copy55
56

57

See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
257 (2007).
See Joel Reidenberg, The Rule of Intellectual Property Law in the Internet
Economy, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1073 (2007); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1998).
See Madison, supra note 45.
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right cartography,58 an effort to make a map that helps us see and know,
as knowledge producers and users, scholars, and would-be policymakers.
The related claim is that the best practices approach works, or at least, that
it can.
V.
I cannot push that point strongly, because the best practices initiative
is a second-best approach to law reform. Fair use is an inherently limited
tool for copyright reformers. Fair use is now held up as central to copyright’s balance between rights owners and readers, scholars, critics, consumers, and other new users,59 but the doctrine was introduced to the law
originally as a lever to expand copyright.60 The underappreciated history
of fair use shows that the doctrine now described as the most important of
copyright’s limitations was designed in Folsom v. Marsh61 to enable the
commercial expansion of copyright — from a circumscribed knowledgepromoting regime founded on unfair competition principles into a fullblown regime based on individual proprietary rights. A non-institutional
sense of fair use, or at least a sense of fair use that is focused principally on
individual interests, risks taking fair use doctrine at face value, rather than
taking it in historical perspective, and feeding the proprietary rights orientation of copyright. The orientation accepts the legitimacy of the copyright owner’s presumptively superior position. Perhaps the most
influential fair use scholarship of the last thirty years, Professor Wendy
Gordon’s Fair Use as Market Failure,62 has been used and perhaps misused
by later scholars and by courts in precisely this way. In that article, Professor Gordon argued that fair use is appropriately applied in contexts where
transactions costs would otherwise prevent the consummation of voluntary
transactions to enable socially valuable uses of copyrighted works. In
practice, courts that have relied on this work have focused on institutional
interests on the copyright-owning side of the transaction, as participants in
copyright markets defined by individual, proprietary rights, and have expressed minimal concern for institutional interests on the consumption
58
59
60

61
62

I am forever indebted to Joseph Scott Miller for reminding me of the several
uses of intellectual property therapy.
See ELDRED V. ASHCROFT, 537 U.S. 186, 219-220 (2003) (characterizing fair
use as one of copyright’s built-in First Amendment accommodations).
See L. Ray Patterson, The Worst Intellectual Property Opinion Ever Written:
Folsom v. Marsh and its Legacy, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 431 (1998); R.
Anthony Reese, The Story of Folsom v. Marsh: Distinguishing Between Infringing and Legitimate Uses, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 259
(Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
Gordon, supra note 16.
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and re-use side of the transaction.63 The transaction has been everything;
the interest in socially valuable uses has been minimized.
Some more recent cases have broken away from that model and
looked to a discipline-based or institutional sense of the accused infringement, building on the suggestion in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.64
that “transformative” uses are more likely to be favored in fair use cases.
The paradigmatic example finding fair use is the Second Circuit’s opinion
in Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd.65 This is the more
traditional route to law reform: if not outright revision of the text of the
fair use statute (or of the scope of copyright as expressed in the copyright
owner’s exclusive rights), then evolution and interpretation of the statute
through repeated judicial application. But this process is slow, even if it is
important, and it is subject to a variety of biases and limits.66 Judges can
pass on only the cases that come before them and that are framed in fair
use terms, and the current state of the law requires that accused defendants plead and prove a fair use defense. Industry and community practice
and the so-called clearance culture in both contexts suggest that the number of such cases is likely to be small, and that disputes are likely to be
framed at the margins of copyright law and practice rather than at its
center.67 Copyright owners are unlikely to bring cases that they are unlikely to win; potential fair users have difficulty initiating cases at all.68
63

64
65

66

67

68

See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th
Cir. 1996); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir.
1994).
510 U.S. 569 (1994).
448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006). Adopting an institutional perspective does not
mean that fair uses always prevail. In Warner Brothers Entertainment, Inc.
v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), the district court rejected a fair use defense to an infringement claim based on the popular
Harry Potter books and accompanying reference works. The defendant had
produced an unauthorized “Lexicon” of Harry Potter characters and references, which the court characterized as “transformative” to the extent that
it served as a reference guide, see id. at 543, but less so to the extent that the
author of the Lexicon wavered in his commitment to the work’s reference
purpose. See id. at 544.
See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882 (2007); Madison, Complexity and Copyright in
Competition, supra note 27.
See Gibson, supra note 66; cf. Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings,
Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that in copyright infringement
lawsuit against provider of digital video recorder system, plaintiff alleged
theories of direct infringement, not contributory infringement, and defendant waived any defense based on fair use).
An even more optimistic view of fair use than I express here would take note
of the fact that fair use might be used offensively by litigants, to protect a
proposed use against a threat of infringement litigation, rather than only
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There is reason to suppose, in other words, that law reform through judicial interpretation is unlikely to be broadly effective in influencing either
individual or institutional practices regarding knowledge and copyright except, possibly, over a long time frame and in favor of proprietary rights.
One worries that implementation of codes of best practices and reliance
on them would reinforce the trend to exclude meaningful copyright disputes from public fora. This, too, is ultimately an empirical question. So
far, the salience of these codes in relevant disciplines appears to be making
understanding of and reliance on fair use or fair use-style arguments more
robust, rather than less. But the day is young.
VI.
What if copyright had a narrower initial scope, one more focused on
knowledge and learning, as the law once was, and one more oriented to
competitive injury than to proprietary right? Do the insights derived from
reflecting on these codes of best practices lose their force?
I think not. Suppose that my premise is wrong, and that abstracted
models and maps that clearly distinguish law and experience are the solution to the Borgesian problem with which I began. These might be based
on legal formalism; they might be based on contemporary law and economics thinking. In that case, however, the cartographic project still needs
to start somewhere. It still needs a prime meridian. The appeal of the best
practices perspective then is not merely that it situates fair use in institutional context and describes knowledge and creativity as inherently social.
The added virtue of the best practices perspective is that it does not regard
fair use merely as an antidote to broad copyright (because doing so feeds
defensively. See Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(describing lawsuit filed by scholar against the owner of copyrights in the
works of James Joyce, seeking a declaration of noninfringement with respect to the plaintiff’s use of the works of James Joyce). The recent decision
of the Supreme Court in Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237
(2010), widens the potential scope of these claims, by giving federal courts
the power to hear claims involving works whose copyrights have not been
registered. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2006) (requiring that a copyright be registered before a civil action for infringement may be instituted). Before
Muchnick, a prospective defendant alleging a defense based on fair use
would have no recourse in federal court against a potential copyright plaintiff who had not (yet) registered the copyright in the work. After
Muchnick, that putative infringer may file a declaratory judgment lawsuit to
vindicate a fair use claim. A declaratory judgment lawsuit, like proposed
administrative processes for clearing fair uses of copyrighted works, see
Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087 (2007); David
Nimmer, A Modest Proposal to Streamline Fair Use Determinations, 24
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 11 (2006), benefits would-be fair users with
time to litigate and/or with financial resources.
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broad copyright!), but instead treats fair use as an independent normative
good — in distinct legal and experiential ways, beyond the particular value
of a given work of authorship. It is important to see these codes of best
practices not merely as instances of custom affirmed as informal law but
also as institutional lattices on which practice and prospect may converge,
enabling expression in contexts and communities that are related to copyright law. All expressive communities are related to copyright law, and
they map onto the law (as the law maps onto them) in partial, imperfect
ways.
Put a documentary filmmaker with an interest in using copyrighted
material via a fair use justification up against the owner of a copyright in
the filmmaker’s source. The best practices perspective implicitly argues
that the filmmaker’s normative claim is not inherently subordinate to the
copyright owner’s claim; the temporal bias that usually prioritizes the copyright owner’s position has been eliminated. The filmmaker is not necessarily the copyright rule, but neither is the filmmaker necessarily the
copyright exception. The filmmaker has a normative claim to use of the
copyrighted material that exists regardless of the scope of copyright in the
first place. The filmmaker’s claim might stand on and be disciplined by
institutional context. Or the filmmaker’s claim might stand on and be disciplined by a more abstract set of legal principles that describe competitive
injury and the public good. The version that we prefer will depend on the
scale of the map that we believe is right, on whether the map should be
supplied exclusively by the government (acting as a flawed agent for the
voting public69), and ultimately on the effectiveness of the map in showing society its various destinations. Which version is more effective not
just in guiding the filmmaker but in enabling the filmmaker to explore?
Which version effectively accommodates not only the filmmaker but the
others — copyright owners, knowledge producers and users — who wish
to use the same map?

69

See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987) (describing processes that underlie copyright
legislation).

